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DOUBLE JEOPARDY

As discussed, once a plea has been offered and a sentence
issued, the judgment is final and cannot be collaterally attacked
for want of facts or lack of knowledge.4" In addition, New York
courts have not recognized, with respect to double jeopardy, a
defense for a person who foregoes the opportunity to challenge an
indictment before admitting guilt to those charges.
Notwithstanding the New York courts' position on double
jeopardy, an exception has been established and recognized by
the Supreme Court.' In situations "'where the state is precluded
by the United States Constitution from haling a defendant into
court on a charge, federal law requires that a conviction on that
charge be set aside even if the conviction was entered pursuant to
a counseled plea of guilty.'" 47 Again, there are no significant or
distinguishing factors between the United States and New York
Constitutions with respect to the courts' disposition of a double
jeopardy issue.
People v. Vasquez4 8
(decided March 20, 1997)
In February 1994, Vasquez was incarcerated at the Elmira
Correctional Facility.4 9 During a routine metal detector search,

corrections officer's saw Edwin Vasquez throw a metal object
into a laundry basket.5 0 The object that was recovered by the
correction officers was a sharpened piece of metal, commonly
known as a shank .5 During the time of the incident, "Vasquez
was serving an indeterminate sentence of five to ten years for
criminal possession of a controlled substance and a concurrent
Latham, 90 N.Y.2d at 798-99, 689 N.E.2d at 527-28, 666 N.Y.S.2d at
557-58.
46 See Broce, 488 U.S. at 574.
47 d. at 575 (citing Blackledge
v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (quoting Menna
4n

v. New York, 423 U.S. at 62 (1975)).
4889

49 1d.

N.Y.2d 521, 678 N.E.2d 482, 655 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1997).
at 525, 678 N.E.2d at 484, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 872.

5 Id.
51 Id.
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and a half to five years for criminal
indeterminate sentence of5two
2

possession of a weapon."
Vasquez was charged by a prison official with a "Tier III
violation of the Standards of Inmate Behavior." 53 Following a
Superintendent's Hearing, Vasquez was found guilty54 and
received a disciplinary penalty of 145 days in the Special Housing
55

Unit.

Subsequently, Vasquez was indicted by the Chemung County
Grand Jury for the same prison infraction 56 where he was charged
with promoting prison contraband, in violation of New York
Vasquez moved to dismiss the indictment
Penal Law § 205.25.
on double jeopardy grounds but the trial court denied his
motion.58 Eventually, Vasquez was convicted by a jury and
sentenced to three to six years as a second felony offender. 59 The
Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision and Vasquez
then appealed to the Court of Appeals. 6°
In Cordero v. Lalor,61 Vasquez's companion case, Jose Cordero
was similarly charged with using a shank in a prison setting.62 As
a result of his attempt to stab a fellow inmate, Cordero was
52

Id.

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 270.2 (1995). A Tier III
violation subjects the inmate to a superintendent's hearing under N.Y. COMP.
CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 254 (1995). Id.
'Vasquez, 89 N.Y.2d at 525, 678 N.E.2d at 484, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
The opinion mentions that Vasquez's record did not reflect the specific section
of the Standards of Inmate Behavior that he violated. Id. at 525 n.1, 678
N.E.2d at 484 n.1, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 872 n.1.
55 Id. at 525, 678 N.E.2d at 484, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
53

56 Id.

Id. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.25 (McKinney 1992). Penal Law
§ 205.25 states that: "A person is guilty of promoting prison contraband in the
first degree when: (1) [h]e knowingly and unlawfully introduces any dangerous
contraband into a detention facility; or (2) being a person confined in a
detention facility, he knowingly and unlawfully makes, obtains or possesses
any dangerous contraband." Id.
58 Vasquez, 89 N.Y.2d at 525, 678 N.E.2d at 484, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
57

59

d.

60

Id. at 526, 678 N.E.2d at 484, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
61 Id. at 525, 678 N.E.2d at 482, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 870.
62 Id. at 526, 678 N.E.2d at 484, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
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charged with four violations of the Standards of Inmate
Behavior.63 The charges included: assault on an inmate, fighting,
possession of a weapon, and refusing to obey a direct order. '
After a Superintendent's Hearing (Tier III disciplinary hearing),
he was found guilty on all charges 65 and given 18 months in a

special housing unit with a one year loss of good time.6
Following the discipline hearing and sentence, Cordero was
indicted one week later by the Greene County Grand Jury.67
Cordero was indicted for assault, criminal possession of a
weapon, and promotion of prison contraband. 6 Cordero pled
guilty to the assault charge in full satisfaction of all charges.6 He
did, however, preserve his appeal of the judgment against him on
double jeopardy grounds, his guilty plea was made subject to
retaining this appealable issue.7 ° As with Vasquez's case, the
trial court held a hearing and found that Cordero's indictment by
the County Grand Jury and his subsequent plea on those charges
did not violate double jeopardy protections.7 The trial court
determined that although the prison disciplinary action was a

form of punishment, the subsequent hearing and sentence by the
County Grand Jury did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of
either the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution

63 Id.

I Id. Cordero was charged with violating: N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 7, § 270.2 rule 100.10 (1992) (assault); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs.
tit. 7, § 270.2 rule 100.13 (1992) (fighting); N.Y. COMIP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit 7, rule 113.10 (1992) (possession of a weapon); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 7, § 270.2 rule 106.10 (1992) (refusal to obey a direct order). Id.
6 Vasquez, 89 N.Y.2d at 526, 678 N.E.2d at 484, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
66 Id.
7Id.

6

id.

69Id.
70 Id.
71

Id.

72 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides in part:
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life and limb .... " Id.
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nor the New York State Constitution Article I, section 6" because
the court concluded that the first prison proceeding did not

preclude a subsequent prosecution of Cordero.7 4
Cordero, after the trial court denied his double jeopardy

motion, commenced an Article 78 proceeding75 in the nature of a
writ of prohibition in the Appellate Division, arguing that
criminal prosecution by the County Grand Jury should be
prohibited on double jeopardy grounds under both the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article I, section 6
of the New York State Constitution, as well as under Article 40
of the Criminal Procedure Law [hereinafter "CPL"].76 The
7 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
Which states in part: "[n]o person shall be
subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Id. The Vasquez
court notes that since the New York State Constitution provides no more
protection than the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution that the
Fifth Amendment provision will control in this opinion. Vasquez, 89 N.Y.2d
at 526 n.2, 678 N.E.2d at 485 n.2, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 873 n.2.
74Vasquez, 89 N.Y.2d at 526, 678 N.E.2d at 484, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
7' N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7803 (McKinney 1992). Section 7803 limits the scope of
Article 78 to the following questions:
(1) Whether the body or officer failed to perform a duty
enjoined upon it by law; or (2) whether the body or officer
proceeded, is proceeding or is about to proceed without or in
excess of jurisdiction; or (3) whether a procedure was made
in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of
law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion,
including abuse of discretion as to the measure or mode of
penalty or discipline imposed; or (4) whether a determination
made as a result of a hearing held, and at which evidence
was taken, pursuant to direction by law is, on the entire
record, supported by substantial evidence.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7803. See also Vasquez, 89 N.Y.2d at 526, 678 N.E.2d at
485, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
76 Id. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.20 (McKinney 1992). CPL 40.20
states that a person cannot be twice prosecuted for the same offense. Id.
While it is true that CPL 40 does give " additional protections beyond what the
normal dual sovereign would require," the court in Vasquez notes they do not
apply here and that CPL 40 clearly excludes prison disciplinary hearings from
protection under it because they are an administrative action, not a criminal
one. Id. See also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.30 (McKinney 1992). CPL
40.30 defines what a previous prosecution is under the statute. Id. It is
defined as:
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Appellate division dismissed his motion and Cordero appealed to
the Court of Appeals. 7
The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals of
Edwin Vasquez and Jose Cordero's appeals since both prison
infractions were factually similar and presented an identical
issue. 7 The issue that was to be decided by these consolidated
actions was whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I, section
6 of the New York State Constitution bars the criminal
prosecution of an inmate who has previously been sanctioned by
an inmate disciplinary hearing. 79 The Court of Appeals, held that
the sanctions imposed upon the defendants through the prison
disciplinary hearing did not constitute criminal punishment, which
would have triggered double jeopardy. 80
There are two prongs to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 8' The first
offers the criminal defendant protection from multiple
prosecutions for the same crime.82 The second protects against
multiple punishments for the same crime.Y Both Vasquez and
Cordero claimed before the Court of Appeals that it was the
second protection, that of a prohibition on multiple punishments
for the same offense of the Double Jeopardy Clause that was
violated.84

Being charged with an accusatory instrument filed in a court
of this state or any jurisdiction with in the United States, and
when the action: (a) [t]erminates in a conviction upon plea of
guilty; or (b) proceeds to trial and a jury has been impaneled
and sworn or, in the case of a trial by the court without a
jury, a witness is sworn.
Id. Vasquez, 89 N.Y.2d at 526, 678 N.E.2d 485, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
n'Id. at 526-27, 678 N.E.2d at 485, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
78 Id.
791d.
at 525, 678 N.E.2d at 484, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 872
80 Id.
81 Id. at 527, 678 N.E.2d at 485, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
8 Id.
8 Id.
84 Id.
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The Court in Vasquez initially focused on the primary function
of the Double Jeopardy Clause.' The court looks at Helvering v.
Mitchell,86 where the United States Supreme Court concluded that
"Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in
respect to some act or omission; for the double jeopardy clause
prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to
punish criminally for the same offense." 87 According to Mitchell,
a court must engage in statutory interpretation to find out what
the statute calls for in terms of punishment; whether it calls for a
criminal sanction.88 It was in Mitchell that the United States
Supreme Court alluded to the fact that double jeopardy may be
called into play in proceedings which were not criminal in
nature. 9 The Court in Mitchell did not decide specifically on this
issue of whether the Double Jeopardy Clause could be called into
play in a proceeding which was not criminal in nature, rather, the
Court remarked that "[u]nless this sanction was intended as
[criminal] punishment ...
applicable. "90

the double jeopardy clause ... is not

The United States Supreme Court case that tackled the question
of whether Double Jeopardy Clause would be extended to
noncriminal proceedings was United States v. Halper.91

In

Halper, defendant, a manager of a company who provided
medical benefits, had put in 65 false claims for reimbursement of
certain medical expenses to Blue Cross and Blue Shield. 2 He
85 id.

303 U.S. 391 (1938). The Court held that an acquittal of a charge of
willful attempt to evade taxes under the Revenue Act of 1928, Title 1, does not
bar assessment and collection of 50% of the total amount of the deficiency plus
fine and imprisonment. Id at 405. The 50% addition to the tax is not
primarily punitive but is a remedial sanction imposed as a safeguard for
protection of the revenue and to reimburse the Government for expense and
loss resulting from the taxpayer's fraud, thus is civil in nature and double
jeopardy does not apply Id.
86

87

Id. at 399.

88 Id.

89

Id. at 398-99.

90

Id.
' 490 U.S. 435
92Id. at 437.

(1989).
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was found guilty and fined $5,000 and sentenced to two years in
prison. 3 After his criminal trial, the government sued him civilly
in the United States District Court in the Southern District of
New York." The civil penalties under the statute for this type of
fraud were $2,000 per violation. 95 Halper had 65 false claims,
totaling $130,000 in fines under the statute's computations. 96 The
United States Supreme Court held that when a civil penalty rises
to the level that becomes so extreme and so divorced from the
government's actual damages and expenses, this punishment
could trigger double jeopardy protections. 9 In Halper, the fine
given to the defendant was so disproportionate to the crime
committed the Court concluded this was a double jeopardy
violation. 98 However, the case was remanded to the district court
to allow the Government to demonstrate that the original district
court's assessment of the Government's injuries was incorrect. 9
The district court had assessed the Government's actual injuries at
approximately $16,000, a figure that the Government never
disputed, as compared with Halper's asserted liability of
$130,000.'0'
In Halper, the rule was laid out by the Court as:
Where a defendant previously has sustained a
criminal penalty and the civil penalty in the
subsequent proceeding bears no rational relation to
the goal of compensating the government for its
loss, but rather appears to qualify, as punishment
in the plain meaning of the word, then the
defendant is entitled to an accounting of the
Government's damages and costs to determine if

93 id.

91Id. at 438.
95 id.

96 Id.
97Id.

at 442.

98 Id. at 452.
99 Id.

100 Id.
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the penalty sought in fact constitutes a second
punishment.'0 '
Vasquez and Cordero both contend the rule enumerated in
Halper should be applied to their cases because they argued that
the penalties "imposed upon them are so disproportionate that
they must be viewed as constituting ...criminal punishment.""2

The Court in Halper also wrote that its holding was a limited one,
because it was a "rule for the rare case".
The court in Vasquez, disagreeing with the defendants,
explained that the test enumerated in Halper is not the test to use
in order to determine whether a civil punishment triggers double
jeopardy protections.' °4 In explaining why it rejected the Halper
,'103

test, the Vasquez court, cited United States v. Ursery.'O5

In

Ursery, the issue before the United States Supreme Court
involved civil forfeiture statutes.1°6

The statutes covered

forfeitures relating to drugs and money laundering in relation to
the sale of drugs. 107 The Supreme Court rejected the Halper test
for use in civil forfeiture cases because "[i]t is impossible to
quantify... the nonpunitive purposes served by a particular civil
forfeiture." '10 8 Ursery sets forth a two part test to determine
whether a forfeiture is punishment for double jeopardy

'o,
Id. at 449-50.
,oPeople v. Vasquez, 89 N.Y. 2d 521, 529-30, 678 N.E.2d 482, 486-87,
655 N.Y.S.2d 870, 874-75 (1997).
103Halper, 490 U.S. 435 at 449. The Court stated that since the damages in
Halper were easily calculatable the test laid out was essentially an accounting
of what the government had lost.
104 Vasquez, 89 N.Y.2d at 531-32, 678 N.E.2d at 488, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
los 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). The Supreme Court dealt with a forfeiture
proceeding that was against the property allegedly used to manufacture
marijuana in a case where the defendants had already been convicted of drug
conspiracy and money laundering charges. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed
citing double jeopardy grounds. Certiorari was granted. Id. The United
States Supreme Court held that the forfeitures in this case were civil in rem
forfeitures and were not punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Id.
'6 Id. at 2138-39.
'o7Id. at 2139.
"o Id. at 2145.
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purposes.'O' The first part of the test calls for the court to look to
the Congressional intent of the forfeiture statute to see whether it
was designed as a remedial civil sanction.1 The second part of
the test requires the court to look to the statute and determine

whether it is so punitive as to negate Congress' intent to establish
a civil remedy."' The Court in Ursery concluded that Congress
did intend the forfeiture statute to be civil in nature and therefore
the Double Jeopardy Clause was inapplicable."'
In coming to its conclusions, the Vasquez court, cites United
3
States v. Hernandez-Fundora,1
in which the Second Circuit
stated that the Government's interest is to maintain social order
within the prison setting.'
The court in Fundoraopines that it is

a well established fact that punishment imposed by prison
authorities for breaking prison rules does not necessarily prohibit
subsequent criminal prosecution for the same activity.'
The court in Vasquez holds that they "are satisfied that prison
disciplinary rules are intended to serve legitimate noncriminal

10 9

Id. at 2142.
110 Id. (quoting United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
354, 363 (1984)).
111Id.

"Id..

112

58 F.3d 802 (2d Cir. 1995). Defendant, while incarcerated at a federal
correctional facility struck another inmate with a table leg, breaking his jaw.
Id. at 804. Following the incident, defendant was placed in a special housing
unit for disciplinary segregation for 45 days. Id. at 805. A Grand Jury then
indicted defendant with assault within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States (since the defendant was in a federal corrections facility at the time of
the incident). Id. Defendant was found guilty by a jury and was subsequently
sentenced to a 60 month prison sentence. Id. The Court of Appeals held that
the 45 day disciplinary segregation was related to government remedial interest
in maintaining prison order and discipline that did not constitute punishment
for double jeopardy protections. Id. at 806. The court went on to state that
only in rare circumstances in which the disciplinary sanction imposed in a
prison context is grossly disproportionate to the government's interest in
maintaining prison order and discipline will subsequent prosecutions be barred
by double
jeopardy. Id. at 807.
4
1 Id. at 807.
15 Id. at 806.
1
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objectives." 11 6 The Vasquez court also stated that in the
defendants circumstances, the prison disciplinary sanctions did
not increase the length of time of their original convictions,
rather, the disciplinary sanctions were aimed at deterring their
actions to maintain order within the prison setting." 7 In its
decision, Vasquez stated that when a prisoner breaks rules within
the prison setting, he may be breaking rules that are applicable
outside of prison as well."' Upon breaking both sets of rules,
the prisoner may be sanctioned both criminally and institutionally
by society and prison." 9 The Vasquez court stated that "so long
as the disciplinary sanction does not stray so far beyond the
bounds of the separate states interest in maintaining prison
order
20
1
punishment."
criminal
constitute
not
will
it
and safety,
The court in Vasquez held that the prison disciplinary rules at
issue here were not criminal punishments that would call into
effect Double Jeopardy Clause protections, therefore defendants
claim of a Fifth Amendment violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause was unfounded.' 2 ' However, the court left open the
possibility that a prison disciplinary sanction could be so harsh as
to constitute a criminal punishment thus invoking double jeopardy
protections. "'
Defendants had one remaining contention, which was that even
if there was no double jeopardy violation, Article 40 of the New
York States Criminal Procedure Law'23 barred their criminal
convictions. 24 The court in Vasquez responded by explaining
that Article 40 does, in fact, afford additional protections but they
People v. Vasquez, 89 N.Y.2d 521, 532, 678 N.E.2d 482, 488, 655
N.Y.S.2d 870, 876 (1997).
116

117Id.

118Id.

at 529, 678 N.E.2d at 486, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 874.

119Id.
120id.
121 Id.

at 532-33, 678 N.E.2d at 488-89, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 876-77.
"2 Id. at 533, 678 N.E.2d at 489, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
'2 N.Y. CRim PRoc. LAw § 40.30.
The section states in pertinent part:
"[A] person is 'prosecuted' for an offense . . . when he is charged . . . and
when the action ... terminates in a conviction .... ." Id.
124 Id.
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are not implicated in this case."26 The Court of Appeals looked to
the Appellate Division's decision below in Cordero v. Lalor,1 6 in
which that court stated that the definition of a "second
proceeding" under Article 40 does not include a prison
disciplinary hearing for double jeopardy purposes."'
The rights protected by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the
United States Constitution and the New York State Constitution
are the same. 1 The court in Vasquez notes that there was no
claim here that either clause provided more protections than the
other.12 9 The court found that the prosecution of both Vasquez
and Cordero was permissible and not violative of double jeopardy
protections. 13 The prison disciplinary hearings and subsequent
punishments in the two cases were civil in nature, thus, not rising
to the level of criminal punishment that would invoke double
jeopardy."' The Court of Appeals demonstrated that a person can
be criminally and civilly punished for the same action without
invoking the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause, as long
as the civil punishment that is sought is not so disproportionate to
the violation as to constitute criminal punishment." 2 In Vasquez,
the court found that the disciplinary sanctions imposed did "not
constitute criminal punishment triggering double jeopardy
133
protections."

125

Id.

126

227 A.D.2d 848, 642 N.Y.S.2d 399 (3d Dep't 1996). Cordero brought

an Article 78 proceeding to bar his prosecution on charges arising out of his

stabbing incident after he had already been disciplined by prison for the same
incident. Id. The court held that the disciplinary hearing in prison was
administrative and does not bar a subsequent criminal conviction based upon
the same conduct. Id.
127 Id. at 848-49, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 399-400.
11 People v. Vasquez, 89 N.Y.2d 521, 527 n.2, 678 N.E.2d 482, 485 n.2,
655
N.Y.S.2d 870, 873 n.2 (1997).
129
Id.

532-33, 678 N.E.2d at 489, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 876-77.
id.
13 2United States v. Halper, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2142 (1996).
133 Vasquez, 89 N.Y.2d at 532-33, 678 N.E.2d at 488-89, 655 N.Y.S.2d at
876-77.
130 Id. at
131
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